A failure and a success - UNSMIS still in Syria without reason, Senegal to prosecute Hissène Habré

Friday saw two major developments at the UN. First, the Security Council adopted resolution S/RES/2059 (2012) that extends the mandate of the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) for thirty days without any other provisions. If you ask me, this is probably the worst possible decision. Even doing nothing would have been better in my opinion. The Syrian opposition has classified UNSMIS as ineffectual and useless, which is not surprising. Humanitarian law experts from the Red Cross, to the UN Human Rights Council, to Secretary-General have classified the situation in Syria as an internal armed conflict. Following the assassination of several ranking government officials, neither side seems willing to back down, or to be in a position where they could back down even if they wanted to do so. Wednesday's bombing in Damascus makes increasingly clear that Syria will almost certainly be in a state of all-out civil war for at least the next twelve months.

In that context, you have to ask yourself what good can three hundred unarmed observes do in a war zone covering almost a hundred and eighty thousand square kilometres. The mission's purpose was to supervise the implementation of Kofi Annan's peace plan, which Annan himself has declared a failure. It makes you wonder why all members of the Security Council (2059 was adopted unanimously) are so eager to renew this mission.

In terms of other military options, a Libyan style intervention is neither feasible politically nor advisable strategically. In the case of Libya, the government's trump card was the use its air force, an advantage easily negated by the imposition of a no-fly zone. In the case of Syria however, the problem is the government's use of tanks, artillery and other heavy weapons, which are not easily stopped from the air alone. The only strategically viable option I can think of is something resembling what UNPROFOR was supposed to do in Bosnia, and we all know what a disaster that was. 

On the non-military, economic sanction, in particular a rigorous arms embargo, on both sides, would hopefully take the edge of the conflict as the belligerents would begin to run out of ammunition. Of course this will never happen. The BRICS country's are to invested in their arms trade with the Syria government, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, backed by the US, being heavily involved in arming the opposition. Russia in particular has a vested interest in keeping Bashar al-Assad in power. With a NATO member, in the form Turkey, controlling the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, Russia's naval base in Syria is its only direct access to the Mediterranean Sea.

All that considered, my opinion is that the best of the few viable options for the UN is to do nothing, terrible as it may sound. Once a conflict has gotten this far, there is stopping, and with opposing interests at stake, accelerating its course to one outcome or another is not feasible. Meaning, any serious intervention on the part of the UN would only unnecessarily jeopardise lives, without any significant impact.

The other major development on Friday was the final judgement ICJ in Question Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal). In stark contrast to the negative decisions of the Security Council on Syria, I can only describe the judgement as a positive outcome. The concerns former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré, who is currently residing in Senegal. 

 

I'll begin with a bit of background information. Habré came to power in Chad in 1982 as the head of a coup d'état, only to be ousted by a coup himself in 1990. He is accused of political repression, using torture and forced disappearances during his time in office. It's not without reason he has been nicknamed the African Pinochet. Following his fall from power, Habré fled to Senegal, where he has been living ever since. 

After a failed attempt to bring him to trial in Senegal in 2000, several Chadian exiles instituted criminal proceedings against him Belgium under the passive personality laws. These laws say for the most serious crimes under international, namely genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, Belgian courts have jurisdiction if the alleged perpetrator or victim is a citizen or a resident of Belgium. In the case of Hissène Habré, this law is further internationally by the UN Convention against Torture (CAT).

The courts judgement begins with a number of procedural questions. First it evaluates Senegal's claim that there is no dispute between Belgium and Senegal on this question. Given that several Belgian extradition requests, backed by an INTERPOL red-notice, have been declined, and that since 2000 no Senegalese court has dealt with the matter internally, the Court comes to the obvious conclusion that this claim is patently absurd. Next it considers other question surrounding the Court's jurisdiction in this case. It finds that it doesn't have jurisdiction to consider Belgium's claims under customary international law, but does have jurisdiction to evaluate question relating to the CAT. 

 

The final procedural question considered by the court is the admissibility of Belgium's claim, and this is where it gets gets particularly interesting. The court finds that Belgium's claim is admissible simply because it is party to the Convention against Torture: “[T]he Court concludes that Belgium, as a state party to the Convention against Torture, has standing to invoke the responsibility of Senegal for the alleged breaches of its obligations under...the Convention in present proceedings.” It goes on to state that whatever particular right Belgium may in the proceedings is therefore not relevant.

 This is particularly powerful, because it means that Senegal has breached its international obligations, not only towards Belgium, but towards every other State party to CAT. This means that there are now some 145 countries with a right, maybe even an obligation, to demand that Senegal bring Hissène Habré to trial, or extradite him to another country for that purpose.

Finally, the court evaluates the substantive merits of the case, and comes to the natural conclusion that Senegal has an obligation to prosecute or extradite Hissène Habré and that its reason for not doing so are insufficient under international law:

“The Court...unanimously finds that the Republic of Senegal must, without further delay, submit the case of Mr. Hissène Habré to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, if it does not extradite him.”

Bill 78 as bad as Syria? The power of press distortion

After a six week absence, I find I once again have the necessary time and energy to research and write my opinions again properly. I will most likely not be continuing this blog as a weekly feature, but I will post my thoughts on the UN from time to time.

Today I will focus, by means of an example, on an issue that has bothered almost since I first started studying the United Nations. To most who have not studied it, the function and politics of the UN are deeply misunderstood. I will focus on a recent example of this and attempt to rectify this problem at least among the few who will read this.

My example is from a few weeks ago when Navi Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights delivered her annual address to the Human Rights Council. For this speech she was heavily criticised in the press, in particular in Quebec, for addressing the on going student protests there and human rights implications of bill 78, while neglecting to even mention human rights situation in Syria. To the uniformed observer, this will undoubtedly seem strange, even outrageous, but the inclusion and exclusion criteria for the speech are simply not understood, or even considered in the press.

First one must consider Madam Pillay's audience. These people are Permanent- and Deputy Permanent Representatives the UN Offices in Geneva. Not only did all of them know in advance what Madam Pillay would say, but are sufficiently well informed to be aware of almost any fact she could included in her address. As such, one must conclude that purpose of this speech was not informative, making the gravity of a situation not the only, and certainly not the foremost inclusion criteria. 

What has to be understood, is that the High Commissioner is essentially a lobbyist. She has little to no executive authority, and has an incredibly limited means with which to implement an agenda of improving human rights. What influence she has, she draws from using her credentials as a human rights expert and the legitimacy given to her through her appointment by the Secretary-General and confirmation by the General Assembly, to convince those with actual power to make decisions in line with goals of her office. One can therefore conclude that purpose of her speech was persuasive, her choice of words weighed against the substantive affect of saying or not saying them.

In the case of Syria, one must also consider, in addition the High Commissioner's work, the other UN initiatives in that country, the so-called Stabilisation Mission, Kofi Anan's work as Joint Special Envoy, and to a lesser extent the mediation process regarding the Golan Heights. The Syrian government has on numerous occasions, quite vocally expressed its displeasure at Madam Pillay's work. Just shortly before this speech, the General Assembly voted to extend her mandate, which was set to expire at the end of August, by a count of 192 in favour to 1 against, Syria's being the only voice of dissent. Considering these circumstances, an inflammatory speech condemning Syria's actions, while undoubtedly warranted, would have provoked a strong negative response, and would have done more to undermine than to advance the UN's interests in Syria, and would have done more harm than good to the human rights situation on the ground.

In stark contrast to Syria, Canada is a democracy where public perception of leaders is vital to their ability to function, a country in which “name and shame” is a viable lobbying strategy. Obviously, Navi Pillay is not well known in Canada and her addressing the current situation in Quebec will have little affect, but it will the overall affect will be positive. Given the of the Canadian federation, the High Commissioner's contact with the Quebec government is fairly limited, and as hostile as the current government is to the United Nations, I have to think that the federal government is to invested in the aims Madam Pillay's office to care if she criticises a Canadian province, especially when some of criticism is due. 

The second advantage of addressing bill 78 is that in criticising a western country, the High Commissioner demonstrates, in particular to the developing world, that she is not subordinate the interests of rich, and will gain some small amount of political capital to expend where her work is more urgently needed.

In conclusion, I have to say that I deeply concerned by the willingness in the press to take the words of one of the most competent human rights experts on the planet and misconstrue them, without any regard for how they were chosen, to form a statement that is patently ridiculous, that the violence in Syria and the student protests in Quebec are of comparable gravity. Though I have to admit I can understand why. Outrage sells.