It is a strange day indeed when I
find myself agreeing with the Canadian government on a matter of foreign policy, yet
that is exactly the case today. While I don’t particularly like his choice of
words in his address to the General Assembly this morning, I appreciate the
fact that John Baird spoke out against the obsession much of the rest of the
world seems to have with reform of the United Nations and in particular of the
Security Council. The system isn’t perfect. Some reforms are and always will be
necessary. But how is it that whenever conversation turns to this organisation
that does so much good work in this world and remains a pillar of the
international community that the conversation invariably turns to reform?
The answer, at least as far as
western world is concerned, is a simple one. There is a tendency to expect much
more of the UN than of what is capable, and more than those things for which it was
designed. It is because of this misunderstanding, that we all seem to agree, at
least in principle, on Security Council reform for example. In seven years of
studying the UN, I have never heard anyone make a compelling argument defending
the status quo. Yet the arguments clearly exist, because, at least as far as
membership goes, that’s precisely what I believe.
Let me say at the outset I think the
working methods of the Council are flawed. What happens behind the scenes to
negotiate the text of resolutions and presidential statements must be far more
inclusive. Carne Ross, a former chief negotiator for the UK on the Security
Council, once said that the people of Kosovo were never consulted on any of the
resolutions the Council adopted concerning them, and that despite the fact that
the UN ran the Kosovar government for nine years. The people effected by resolution should, whether through state or civil representation, be consulted in their drafting. That being said, changing the
membership structure of the Council will not change that.
The point most often attacked, and
understandably so, is the veto power, and choice of which states hold it. It is
here that we come to our first instance of misunderstanding. In 1945, the
founders of the United Nations were concerned about the possibility of a third
world war. And who can blame them? There had been two in the past thirty years.
In both cases, the spark that lead to war breaking out was a powerful country
attacking a much weaker country, which in turn lead other powerful countries to
take up arms against the former. In 1914, Austria’s invasion of Serbia provoked
Russia into action. While in 1939, Germany’s invasion Poland provoked Britain
and France. What was recognised then, and remains valid to this day, is that if
there were to be a third world war, it would inevitably feature at least two of
the P5 nations on opposing sides. So those states most likely to respond to
overtly belligerent action were given the power to stop the UN from
legitimising it.
In the same vein, the P5 nations
remain the only ones capable of unilaterally undermining decisions of the
Council. We saw this in 2003 with US invasion of Iraq, and in 2008 when Russia
invaded Georgia. Granted, the UK and France have lost significant influence
since 1945, but the EU of which they are a part is certainly more than capable
of defying the Council should it so choose. On the other hand those states
currently seeking permanent membership are not in that position. If India had
objected to intervention in Mali, or Japan to sanctions against Guinea-Bissau,
it would not have been a serious problem. These states contribute significantly
to the United Nations and there support should sought whenever possible.
Invariably, their approval of a particular Council action will be beneficial,
but their objection is neither a threat to international peace and security,
nor does it jeopardise the effectiveness of the action.
The second common criticism is that
the Council is not representative, and I would agree with that. In terms of the
number of member states, Asia is under represented among non-permanent seats,
while Latin America is over represented among the rotating members. However, I reject the notion that this
is a problem. The Council representativeness would be a virtue if the council were an activist body. It is not. As a rule, its inaction
tends to be far more controversial that its action. There was significant
pushback on the intervention in Libya, but that’s not surprising. A third of
the Council did not support resolution 1973, and the intervening forces overstepped
their mandate by quite a ways. That particular case notwithstanding,
resolutions adopted by Council tend to reflect, at least in principle if not in
the particulars, the consensus among international community.
Current composition of the Council is,
in my opinion, a rather elegant balance of legitimacy, relevance, and
effectiveness. The states that need to be there in order to give effect to the
Council decisions are represented, there are enough other states, which are
well distributed enough, to ensure that the rest of the world agrees with
Council action, and the membership is small enough so that the Council can actually get
things done. Council membership is not intuitive. The aesthetics of it often
run contrary to our democratic sensibilities. That makes the Council an easy
target for criticism. It does not, however, make it wrong.
