Security Council Reform: The perspective not heard

It is a strange day indeed when I find myself agreeing with the Canadian government on a matter of foreign policy, yet that is exactly the case today. While I don’t particularly like his choice of words in his address to the General Assembly this morning, I appreciate the fact that John Baird spoke out against the obsession much of the rest of the world seems to have with reform of the United Nations and in particular of the Security Council. The system isn’t perfect. Some reforms are and always will be necessary. But how is it that whenever conversation turns to this organisation that does so much good work in this world and remains a pillar of the international community that the conversation invariably turns to reform?

The answer, at least as far as western world is concerned, is a simple one. There is a tendency to expect much more of the UN than of what is capable, and more than those things for which it was designed. It is because of this misunderstanding, that we all seem to agree, at least in principle, on Security Council reform for example. In seven years of studying the UN, I have never heard anyone make a compelling argument defending the status quo. Yet the arguments clearly exist, because, at least as far as membership goes, that’s precisely what I believe.

Let me say at the outset I think the working methods of the Council are flawed. What happens behind the scenes to negotiate the text of resolutions and presidential statements must be far more inclusive. Carne Ross, a former chief negotiator for the UK on the Security Council, once said that the people of Kosovo were never consulted on any of the resolutions the Council adopted concerning them, and that despite the fact that the UN ran the Kosovar government for nine years. The people effected by resolution should, whether through state or civil representation, be consulted in their drafting. That being said, changing the membership structure of the Council will not change that.

The point most often attacked, and understandably so, is the veto power, and choice of which states hold it. It is here that we come to our first instance of misunderstanding. In 1945, the founders of the United Nations were concerned about the possibility of a third world war. And who can blame them? There had been two in the past thirty years. In both cases, the spark that lead to war breaking out was a powerful country attacking a much weaker country, which in turn lead other powerful countries to take up arms against the former. In 1914, Austria’s invasion of Serbia provoked Russia into action. While in 1939, Germany’s invasion Poland provoked Britain and France. What was recognised then, and remains valid to this day, is that if there were to be a third world war, it would inevitably feature at least two of the P5 nations on opposing sides. So those states most likely to respond to overtly belligerent action were given the power to stop the UN from legitimising it.

In the same vein, the P5 nations remain the only ones capable of unilaterally undermining decisions of the Council. We saw this in 2003 with US invasion of Iraq, and in 2008 when Russia invaded Georgia. Granted, the UK and France have lost significant influence since 1945, but the EU of which they are a part is certainly more than capable of defying the Council should it so choose. On the other hand those states currently seeking permanent membership are not in that position. If India had objected to intervention in Mali, or Japan to sanctions against Guinea-Bissau, it would not have been a serious problem. These states contribute significantly to the United Nations and there support should sought whenever possible. Invariably, their approval of a particular Council action will be beneficial, but their objection is neither a threat to international peace and security, nor does it jeopardise the effectiveness of the action.

The second common criticism is that the Council is not representative, and I would agree with that. In terms of the number of member states, Asia is under represented among non-permanent seats, while Latin America is over represented among the rotating members. However, I reject the notion that this is a problem. The Council representativeness would be a virtue if the council were an activist body. It is not. As a rule, its inaction tends to be far more controversial that its action. There was significant pushback on the intervention in Libya, but that’s not surprising. A third of the Council did not support resolution 1973, and the intervening forces overstepped their mandate by quite a ways. That particular case notwithstanding, resolutions adopted by Council tend to reflect, at least in principle if not in the particulars, the consensus among international community.

Current composition of the Council is, in my opinion, a rather elegant balance of legitimacy, relevance, and effectiveness. The states that need to be there in order to give effect to the Council decisions are represented, there are enough other states, which are well distributed enough, to ensure that the rest of the world agrees with Council action, and the membership is small enough so that the Council can actually get things done. Council membership is not intuitive. The aesthetics of it often run contrary to our democratic sensibilities. That makes the Council an easy target for criticism. It does not, however, make it wrong.

The Mafia State of Azerbaijan: a Case Study of Maj. Ramil Safarov

            The case of Major Ramil Safarov has precious little to do with the UN, except that it is through the UN that I was made aware of it. It is one of the most disturbing stories to come out of the post-Soviet Caucasus recently. Not because of particular violence or brutality, thought it has plenty of that, but because of the utter contempt for the rule of law and of good faith negotiations that are essential for international relations demonstrated by the Azeri government.

            The Ramil Safarov case is just latest manifestation of tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia. As neighbouring peoples the Azeris and the Armenians have been in conflict for centuries. In its current form the conflict is about the Nagorno-Karabakh region, a de facto independent republic in western Azerbaijan with ethnic Armenians form a majority of the region’s population. Tension over control of the region built up in the late eighties, and escalated into all out war following the collapse of the Soviet Union. A Russian brokered ceasefire put an end to hostilities and remains in affect to this day, though both sides commit minor violations on an almost daily basis.

            It is only in this context that Maj. Safarov’s actions make any sense. In 2004, Safarov, then a lieutenant in the Azerbaijan Land Forces, participated in an English language course in Budapest with other officers from all over eastern Europe as part of NATO’s Partnership for Peace Initiative. On the night of 19 February, Lt. Safarov snuck into the dorm of Lt. Gurgen Margaryan, one of two Armenian officers on the course, and brutally murdered him with an axe. He also attempted to kill the other Armenian officer, but was arrested by Hungarian police before he was able to do so. After two years of trial, Hungarian courts sentenced him to life in prison with no possibility of parole for at least thirty years.

            The case took on a new dimension early this year when the Azeri government entered into the negotiations about the possibility of transferring Ramil Safarov to Azerbaijan to serve out the rest of his sentence there. After about six months of negotiation, the Hungarian government was satisfied that Azerbaijan had provided sufficient assurances under the European Convention on the Transfer of Convicted Persons, and Safarov was duly extradited. He was welcomed as a hero in Baku, was immediately granted a pardon by President Ilham Aliyev, promoted to Major, and awarded eight years back pay for the time he spent in prison.

            Appalling as all of this is, it’s not all that surprising when you take a closer look at the man behind the most recent developments. It’s not without reason that in the WikiLeaks cables, President Aliyev is likened to Michael Corleone. He is essentially a mafia boss. He has known ties to the Russian mob, and to criminal elements in the Azeri diaspora, and is a key figure in the Baku underworld. When construed as a mob kingpin rewarding one of his foot soldiers for killing a foot soldier of his most hated enemies, rather than as a head of state flouting international law, the whole affair seems disturbingly normal.

            What is far more concerning is that Azerbaijan currently holds a seat on the UN Security Council. There have been far more unsavoury governments represented on the council (Libya under Gadhafi, Argentina under Peron), this has usually due to functional necessity or lack of good alternatives, but this is not at all the case here. Both Hungary and Slovakia ran for the seat a little over a year ago, and it’s not like Azerbaijan’s is an essential voice for the maintenance of international peace and security. If anything, their actions in Nagorno-Karabakh actively threaten the stability of the region. The only reason I can see that they are on the council is that they ran a successful negative campaign, the first since 1980, against the other two candidates.

Negotiation is not sexy

As a Model UN delegate, an enthusiast for international relations, and, I would like to think, a somewhat accomplished negotiator, I am always a little miffed when, like last Monday, I am confronted with the extent to which negotiation is undervalued. It's considered worthwhile and necessary of course, butt simply put, in our society, negotiation is not sexy. Credit is rarely given where credit is due. For example, Al Gore is the only Kyoto delegate I can name. Of the people who negotiated the four plus two treaty that reunified Germany, only Eduard Shevarnadze, the Soviet delegate, is known to me, and only because he later served as president of Georgia. Without researching it, I could not name anyone present during the negotiations of the Oslo and Dayton Accords; just to name some of the most important negotiations of my lifetime. So naturally, when the Serbian and Kosovar Prime Ministers met for the first time on Monday, during a meeting of the UN Security Council, it took incredibly good luck for me to find out about it, by finding a copy of the Vienna Currier at the Niagara Falls bus terminal (I have no idea how it got there) and even then it was only two sentences at the bottom of page 10.

Reading the transcript of the meeting, in particular the social niceties spoken by the president at the very beginning, I can only imagine the amount of work that went into making the meeting happen. Since no one will, let me say the following: To the diplomats from New York City, to Pristina, to Belgrade and elsewhere, though nothing substantive was decided at the meeting, just getting these two men in the same room a huge step in the right direction, and I salute for it.

As for the meeting itself, it began with a statement by General Farid Zarif, head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), followed by statements by Ivica Dačić (Serbia), Hashim Thaçi (Kosovo), and all fifteen members of the Council. All of what was said was fairly routine. General Zarif described the situation in Kosovo, where the status quo has been more less maintain, precarious calm with continued instances of ethnically motivated violence, the Prime Ministers made statements of mutual non-recognition and politely accused each other of illegitimacy, the NAM and China pushed for further negotiations, Russia supported Serbia, and the US and the EU pushed for recognition of Kosovo's independence. 

What I find far more interesting is how these things were said. As I said earlier, the social niceties are particularly telling. The language use by Gérard Araud, the French representative, more less matched that of the Non-Aligned States while speaking as President of the Council, referring to Hashim Thaçi by his name only, but addressing him as His Excellency the Prime Minister of Kosovo while speaking for the French Republic. To me this suggests that the NAM, probably by simple strength in numbers, controls the UN's political position vis à vis Kosovo. 

Another interesting contrast in this respect, is that the NAM states all thanked Hashim Thaçi for his statement, while the Chinese representative, though making a similar statement on all other points, merely stated that he had merely “listened attentively to the statement made by Mr. Thaçi,” probably wanting to placate Russia who used the same sentence, word for word, at the beginning of their statement.

The final point that interests me, is that Ivica Dačić insinuated that certain countries, probably the EU and the US, have been playing political games with the UNMIK budget. According to Prime Minister Dačić, the General Assembly deliberately underfinanced the mission, making it necessary to rely more heavily on the, in his opinion illegitimate, Kosovar authorities in order to fulfil the mission's mandate.

A failure and a success - UNSMIS still in Syria without reason, Senegal to prosecute Hissène Habré

Friday saw two major developments at the UN. First, the Security Council adopted resolution S/RES/2059 (2012) that extends the mandate of the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) for thirty days without any other provisions. If you ask me, this is probably the worst possible decision. Even doing nothing would have been better in my opinion. The Syrian opposition has classified UNSMIS as ineffectual and useless, which is not surprising. Humanitarian law experts from the Red Cross, to the UN Human Rights Council, to Secretary-General have classified the situation in Syria as an internal armed conflict. Following the assassination of several ranking government officials, neither side seems willing to back down, or to be in a position where they could back down even if they wanted to do so. Wednesday's bombing in Damascus makes increasingly clear that Syria will almost certainly be in a state of all-out civil war for at least the next twelve months.

In that context, you have to ask yourself what good can three hundred unarmed observes do in a war zone covering almost a hundred and eighty thousand square kilometres. The mission's purpose was to supervise the implementation of Kofi Annan's peace plan, which Annan himself has declared a failure. It makes you wonder why all members of the Security Council (2059 was adopted unanimously) are so eager to renew this mission.

In terms of other military options, a Libyan style intervention is neither feasible politically nor advisable strategically. In the case of Libya, the government's trump card was the use its air force, an advantage easily negated by the imposition of a no-fly zone. In the case of Syria however, the problem is the government's use of tanks, artillery and other heavy weapons, which are not easily stopped from the air alone. The only strategically viable option I can think of is something resembling what UNPROFOR was supposed to do in Bosnia, and we all know what a disaster that was. 

On the non-military, economic sanction, in particular a rigorous arms embargo, on both sides, would hopefully take the edge of the conflict as the belligerents would begin to run out of ammunition. Of course this will never happen. The BRICS country's are to invested in their arms trade with the Syria government, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, backed by the US, being heavily involved in arming the opposition. Russia in particular has a vested interest in keeping Bashar al-Assad in power. With a NATO member, in the form Turkey, controlling the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, Russia's naval base in Syria is its only direct access to the Mediterranean Sea.

All that considered, my opinion is that the best of the few viable options for the UN is to do nothing, terrible as it may sound. Once a conflict has gotten this far, there is stopping, and with opposing interests at stake, accelerating its course to one outcome or another is not feasible. Meaning, any serious intervention on the part of the UN would only unnecessarily jeopardise lives, without any significant impact.

The other major development on Friday was the final judgement ICJ in Question Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal). In stark contrast to the negative decisions of the Security Council on Syria, I can only describe the judgement as a positive outcome. The concerns former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré, who is currently residing in Senegal. 

 

I'll begin with a bit of background information. Habré came to power in Chad in 1982 as the head of a coup d'état, only to be ousted by a coup himself in 1990. He is accused of political repression, using torture and forced disappearances during his time in office. It's not without reason he has been nicknamed the African Pinochet. Following his fall from power, Habré fled to Senegal, where he has been living ever since. 

After a failed attempt to bring him to trial in Senegal in 2000, several Chadian exiles instituted criminal proceedings against him Belgium under the passive personality laws. These laws say for the most serious crimes under international, namely genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, Belgian courts have jurisdiction if the alleged perpetrator or victim is a citizen or a resident of Belgium. In the case of Hissène Habré, this law is further internationally by the UN Convention against Torture (CAT).

The courts judgement begins with a number of procedural questions. First it evaluates Senegal's claim that there is no dispute between Belgium and Senegal on this question. Given that several Belgian extradition requests, backed by an INTERPOL red-notice, have been declined, and that since 2000 no Senegalese court has dealt with the matter internally, the Court comes to the obvious conclusion that this claim is patently absurd. Next it considers other question surrounding the Court's jurisdiction in this case. It finds that it doesn't have jurisdiction to consider Belgium's claims under customary international law, but does have jurisdiction to evaluate question relating to the CAT. 

 

The final procedural question considered by the court is the admissibility of Belgium's claim, and this is where it gets gets particularly interesting. The court finds that Belgium's claim is admissible simply because it is party to the Convention against Torture: “[T]he Court concludes that Belgium, as a state party to the Convention against Torture, has standing to invoke the responsibility of Senegal for the alleged breaches of its obligations under...the Convention in present proceedings.” It goes on to state that whatever particular right Belgium may in the proceedings is therefore not relevant.

 This is particularly powerful, because it means that Senegal has breached its international obligations, not only towards Belgium, but towards every other State party to CAT. This means that there are now some 145 countries with a right, maybe even an obligation, to demand that Senegal bring Hissène Habré to trial, or extradite him to another country for that purpose.

Finally, the court evaluates the substantive merits of the case, and comes to the natural conclusion that Senegal has an obligation to prosecute or extradite Hissène Habré and that its reason for not doing so are insufficient under international law:

“The Court...unanimously finds that the Republic of Senegal must, without further delay, submit the case of Mr. Hissène Habré to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, if it does not extradite him.”

Bill 78 as bad as Syria? The power of press distortion

After a six week absence, I find I once again have the necessary time and energy to research and write my opinions again properly. I will most likely not be continuing this blog as a weekly feature, but I will post my thoughts on the UN from time to time.

Today I will focus, by means of an example, on an issue that has bothered almost since I first started studying the United Nations. To most who have not studied it, the function and politics of the UN are deeply misunderstood. I will focus on a recent example of this and attempt to rectify this problem at least among the few who will read this.

My example is from a few weeks ago when Navi Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights delivered her annual address to the Human Rights Council. For this speech she was heavily criticised in the press, in particular in Quebec, for addressing the on going student protests there and human rights implications of bill 78, while neglecting to even mention human rights situation in Syria. To the uniformed observer, this will undoubtedly seem strange, even outrageous, but the inclusion and exclusion criteria for the speech are simply not understood, or even considered in the press.

First one must consider Madam Pillay's audience. These people are Permanent- and Deputy Permanent Representatives the UN Offices in Geneva. Not only did all of them know in advance what Madam Pillay would say, but are sufficiently well informed to be aware of almost any fact she could included in her address. As such, one must conclude that purpose of this speech was not informative, making the gravity of a situation not the only, and certainly not the foremost inclusion criteria. 

What has to be understood, is that the High Commissioner is essentially a lobbyist. She has little to no executive authority, and has an incredibly limited means with which to implement an agenda of improving human rights. What influence she has, she draws from using her credentials as a human rights expert and the legitimacy given to her through her appointment by the Secretary-General and confirmation by the General Assembly, to convince those with actual power to make decisions in line with goals of her office. One can therefore conclude that purpose of her speech was persuasive, her choice of words weighed against the substantive affect of saying or not saying them.

In the case of Syria, one must also consider, in addition the High Commissioner's work, the other UN initiatives in that country, the so-called Stabilisation Mission, Kofi Anan's work as Joint Special Envoy, and to a lesser extent the mediation process regarding the Golan Heights. The Syrian government has on numerous occasions, quite vocally expressed its displeasure at Madam Pillay's work. Just shortly before this speech, the General Assembly voted to extend her mandate, which was set to expire at the end of August, by a count of 192 in favour to 1 against, Syria's being the only voice of dissent. Considering these circumstances, an inflammatory speech condemning Syria's actions, while undoubtedly warranted, would have provoked a strong negative response, and would have done more to undermine than to advance the UN's interests in Syria, and would have done more harm than good to the human rights situation on the ground.

In stark contrast to Syria, Canada is a democracy where public perception of leaders is vital to their ability to function, a country in which “name and shame” is a viable lobbying strategy. Obviously, Navi Pillay is not well known in Canada and her addressing the current situation in Quebec will have little affect, but it will the overall affect will be positive. Given the of the Canadian federation, the High Commissioner's contact with the Quebec government is fairly limited, and as hostile as the current government is to the United Nations, I have to think that the federal government is to invested in the aims Madam Pillay's office to care if she criticises a Canadian province, especially when some of criticism is due. 

The second advantage of addressing bill 78 is that in criticising a western country, the High Commissioner demonstrates, in particular to the developing world, that she is not subordinate the interests of rich, and will gain some small amount of political capital to expend where her work is more urgently needed.

In conclusion, I have to say that I deeply concerned by the willingness in the press to take the words of one of the most competent human rights experts on the planet and misconstrue them, without any regard for how they were chosen, to form a statement that is patently ridiculous, that the violence in Syria and the student protests in Quebec are of comparable gravity. Though I have to admit I can understand why. Outrage sells.

3 June 2012

    As promised, I'll start this week the events of last Sunday in El-Houleh. I won't go into much detail on the attack itself, as there isn't much to say. It was a horrific attack on innocent civilians by the Assad government. I will instead focus on the reaction of the UN and the implications this attack has for the Organisation.
    On the  same day, the Security Council issued a press statement condemning "in the strongest possible terms the killing...of dozens of men, women and children and the wounding of hundreds more...in attacks that involved a series of Government artillery and tank shelling on a residential neighbourhood."  This was to be expected. Other expected reactions include condemnations by Ban Ki-moon, and Kofi Annan, and a demand for consequences by Navi Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The reaction that surprised me, however, were French president François Hollande's public musings about a military intervention. Given that he explicitly said France would not intervene without a UN mandate, I can only assume that this is a political maneuver. Russia and China still categorically reject any intervention in Syria. Russia in particular has a vested interest in keeping President Assad in power. Until this changes, there will be no UN mandate.
    There being no veto to over come, the Human Rights Council reacted far more decisively to the attacks. On Friday, it convened a special session to address the matter, and adopted a resolution deploying a civilian fact finding mission to El-Houleh, and established an independent, international inquiry into the matter. What strikes me about this is how its being reported in the press. ARD, the German public broadcaster reported that the Council had referred the situation to the International Criminal Court. While it certainly wouldn't be uncalled for for the ICC prosecutor to investigate the matter proprio motu under article 15 of the Rome Statute, the Human Rights Council did not ask him do so. In fact, such a  request must come from the Security Council.
    The other UN matter these attacks call into question is the UN Stabilisation Mission in Syria (UNSMIS). I must admit I am somewhat torn on this matter. UNSMIS was not able to prevent these attacks, but that is not their mandate.  Following the attacks, UNSMIS did exactly what it was set up to do. The mission investigated the attack and confirmed the use of tanks and artillery against civilians. Without the mission on the ground, I would guess we would have a few unreliable reports of government shelling, government propaganda blaming the attack on terrorists, and a shouting match between the Syrian government and the west over who was responsible. As is we have a much clearer picture.
    This week also saw the release of the latest IAEA report on the Iranian Nuclear Programme. The Director-General was less scathing in this report than his last report seven months ago. He gives Iran credit for coming closer to reaching a structured inspection agreement with the agency, and for complying with one of three aspects of the nuclear ban imposed by the Security Council, namely the suspension of reprocessing activities. However, the report still paints a fairly disturbing picture. Since 2002, Iran has processed roughly 55 tonnes of uranium hexafluoride, to produce 6 tonnes of 5% enriched uranium, the upper limit for safe use in nuclear power plants, and 150 Kg of 20% enriched uranium. To put this into perspective, the latter amounts to only slightly less fissile material than what was used in the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. There are still undisclosed and improperly disclosed nuclear sites. Iran continues to ignore the ban on heavy-water activities as well.
    Strangely, the report makes no mention of the negotiations between Iran and P5 + Germany held in Istanbul earlier this year. I can only imagine that this is due to a mandate issue. The negotiations are clearly within the scope of the report, but were held outside the framework of the United Nations. My guess is that the Director General may only report on the activity of the IAEA on the matter.
    Finally, I would like to address a number of statements made by UN Human Rights Officials this week. When I first started writing about the UN six weeks ago, I never expected I would be dealing with Canadian domestic politics with such regularity, but for the second time in three weeks UN Special Rapporteurs in the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights have been very critical of Canada, and rightfully so.
    First, Maina Kiai, UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, both heavily criticised Bill 78 of the Quebec National Assembly, as violating the fundamental rights in their respective mandates.
     Second, the Committee against Torture accused Canada of complicity in torture. Citing several the cases of Maher Arar, and Omar Khadr among others, the committee pointed out several instances in which actions by the Canadian government lead to individuals being tortured, and blamed changes in Canada's immigration policy. The committee recommended the immediate transfer of Omar Khadr to Canadian custody, and the compensation of three men bein held on so-called security certificates.

27 May 2012

This week was a rather light one in terms of official meetings at the UN. In fact it was the first meeting since the end of break for New Years and Christmas in which the Security Council held no official meetings. This is not without reason though. This past week, the Security Council conducted an official visit to West Africa, visiting Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, and Sierra Leone. While all fifteen members of the Council sent representatives on the trip, Vitaly Churkin and Li Baodong, the permanent representatives of Russia and China respectively, were notably absent from the Council's delegation. I can only speculate that this due to some objection to the peacekeeping missions in the the three countries on the itinerary or to the Council's response to the recent coups d'états in Mali and Guinea-Bissau. 

In the first leg of the trip, Council members visited Liberia to evaluate both the sanctions against that country and the peacekeeping mission deployed there. Liberia, it has to be said, is one of the few political success stories in Africa. In the decade following the end of the most recent civil war, the country transitioned quickly to not only a fragile peace, but a developing democracy. The 2005 elections saw the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf to the presidency. Johnson Sirleaf is not only the first woman to lead an African country, but is regarded internationally as a committed democrat. Last year she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

Given these developments, there are some both in Liberia and internationally who have began to question the need for sanctions and for the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). In his most recent report on the matter, Ban Ki-moon recommended a three-withdrawal of UNMIL. What concerns me, however, is what will happen in 2017 when President Johnson Sirleaf is constitutionally required to step down. I can only hope that some portion of UNMIL remains on the ground at least until then and that, if should matters escalate, the mission is able to fulfil its mandate and keep the peace.

 

The second leg, while in Côte d'Ivoire, again to inspect the peacekeeping mission, and to discuss the issue of refugees on the border with Liberia. At present, there are a significant number of Ivorian refugees in Liberia, and Liberian refugees in Côte d'Ivoire, with both groups claiming it is less safe in the other country. One of the stranger things to come out of these meetings is that the Ivorian refugees seem to be claiming their country has been overrun by Burkinabé. The people they are referring to are in fact Ivorians who supporter President Alassane Outtara whose citizenship has been called into question. Best I can tell, the claim that Outtara is in fact a citizen of Burkina Faso is a complete fabrication. I would guess that it was an attempt by his predecessor, Laurent Gbagbo, to discredit him during last year's election and ensuing violence.

Also on this portion of the trip, Council members met with representatives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as Côte d'Ivoire currently serves as chair of the ECOWAS Commission. Main topics on the agenda being the recent coups in West Africa, in which ECOWAS has served as a mediator in an attempt to ensure stability and keep matters from escalating.

In the final leg, in Sierra Leone, Council members met with ranking members of Sierra Leonean government, and with leaders of the peacekeeping and civilian missions in that country. Relations between the UN and Sierra Leone are somewhat strained at the moment, after the government expelled Michael von der Schulenburg, Executive Representative of the Secretary-General to Sierra Leone, fearing that his continued presence would pose threat to their reelection in November. Admittedly, they may have a point that Count von der Schulenburg overstepped his authority and “interfered in the internal affairs of Sierra Leone”. Unfortunately there is very little impartial information available on the subject.

The other major development at the UN this week was the reappointment of Navi Pillay as High Commissioner for Human Rights. Prior to her appointment to the post in 2008, Mrs. Pillay served five years as a judge on the International Criminal Court, and eight years as a judge on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, including four as the Tribunal's president. Much to the surprise of exactly no one, Syria objected to her reappointment. Syria accused her of lacking objectivity in her analysis of the Syrian and of not respecting Syria's sovereignty. Perhaps more disturbing is the way in which her office has been used, in particular by Russia and China, as a means of justifying inaction deteriorating human rights and security situations. Until about a month ago, when the Security Council began taking action on Syria, Russia and China continued to insist that the matter be studied by the High Commissioner, and be handled exclusively by the General Assembly 3^rd Committee.

On a final note, I would briefly like to address this morning's attacks in Syria. At the time of writing this, the UN has not yet made a concrete response the attack. I will undoubtedly be covering the matter in much more detail next week.