The things we choose to care about: ICJ decision on the Contra Affair

There is a scene in The West Wing where the president and his chief of staff are discussing an attempt to bring a foreign leader to trial in the US for using his position to support terrorists. The chief of staff says that they have to make sure that his plane lands in D.C. proper and not one of the nearby airports in Virginia or Maryland to ensure that a federal court has jurisdiction. The president just smiles and shakes his head, and then says, “You know, the law cracks me up sometimes. The things we choose to care about…”

This is precisely how I felt recently when I read the ICJ decision in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States). For Model UN geeks like myself this is a fairly famous and significant case for establishing the so-called effective control rule. In its 1986 decision, the court established the rule that if a state has effective control over a foreign violent non-state actor, in this case the Contras, then the state has some responsibility for the group’s actions. However, that is not what I’m going to be talking about here. Instead, I’m going to focus on the less well known 1984 decision in the same case on preliminary objections raised by the US government, because it really does leave you shaking your head and makes you ask why any of this matters.

The US objected to the jurisdiction of the court to even entertain the case. In this particular case, Nicaragua’s claim to jurisdiction was based on declarations. The Statute of the ICJ allows parties to make declarations accepting the jurisdiction of the Court in certain areas of international law and spells out what restriction and conditions, like reciprocity, may placed on the these declarations. The United States had made such a declaration in 1946, and was found to be in good standing.

The issues were with Nicaraguan declaration, arising from a small but significant divergence between the French and English texts of the Statute of the Court. The Statute has provisions setting up the ICJ as a successor the to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the judicial body of the League of Nations. The PCIJ allowed for similar declarations, so the Statute basically says that declarations made for the PCIJ also apply to ICJ. The issue is that the English text refers to “declarations…which are still in force”, whereas the French text refers to “déclarations faites…pour une durée qui n’est pas encore expirée” (declarations made for a duration which has not yet expired). While these expressions obviously mean very different things, cases in which a declaration is included by one formulation, but excluded by the other are not going be common. However, Nicaragua’s declaration is precisely such a case. The declaration was made unconditionally and without temporal limits, so clearly for a duration, which had not expired, but it had never entered into force (at least for the PCIJ).

The reasons why this happened is where you get the “things we choose care about” moment. In 1929, Nicaragua’s ambassador in Geneva on instructions from President Jose Maria Moncada made a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the PCIJ. However, unlike ICJ declarations, PCIJ declarations were subject to ratification. This took a while, but in 1935, the Nicaraguan parliament ratified the declaration. Despite all of this, the declaration never entered into force, because an instrument of ratification was never deposited with Secretary-General of the League of Nations. The reason for this is that it never made it to Geneva. It was sent by sea a few years later, but, with World War Two having broken out, the ship it was on was sunk by German U-boats. And so because of a seemingly unrelated act of economic warfare some fifty years prior, the jurisdiction of the ICJ was called into question.

In the end, the Court ruled that Nicaragua’s declaration did fall within the scope the succession provisions and had entered into force when Nicaragua joined the UN, but it really does make me echo Jed Bartlet’s sentiments: “The law cracks me up sometimes.”

SC elections and things that don't make sense

After years of studying the UN, I’ve now gotten to the point where most of the time I more or less know what’s going on at the UN and why. So naturally I have just one question for the Saudi Foreign Ministry: What the fuck?

I apologize for the vulgarity, but it is proportional to my inability rationalize Saudi Arabia’s actions. Now, I suspect most people reading this don’t have the faintest idea what I’m on about so let me explain. Every year the UN General Assembly elects five states to serve as non-permanent members of the Security Council for the next two years. In odd numbered years, one of these five states must be from Eastern Europe, one from Latin America or the Caribbean, one from Asia, and two from Africa. Additionally, one of the three seats allocated to Africa and Asia must be held by an Arab state alternating between Africa and Asia.

In light of these rules, I’ve always found Saudi SC membership policy somewhat perplexing. The Arab Swing Seat has essentially meant that since the current rules were introduced in 1965, Saudi Arabia was in a position to say, “We want a seat on the Council” every four years and could reasonably expect to get elected every time. Yet, they never chose to do so. Although a founding member of the UN, and significant regional power, Saudi Arabia has served a sum total of zero years on the Security Council.

While I don’t know the actual reason for this decision, it’s not too difficult to come up with a plausible one. Given Saudi Arabia’s incredibly complicated relationship with the United States, Council membership could easily have put the Saudi government in an awkward position of either going against it’s policy on Israel in voting for an essentially pro Israel resolution, or jeopardize it’s relationship with the US by voting against. (For non-permanent members, an abstention is essentially a symbolic no vote.)

However, all that changed two years ago when Saudi Arabia declared its candidacy for the 2013 Security Council election. While, as is the case with much of Saudi foreign policy, the reasoning for this decision remains unclear, I strongly suspect the beginnings of the Arab Spring were strong factor. The events that followed were fairly predictable. With only a limited number of eligible states, most of which have friendly relations with Saudi Arabia and no real chance of beating them in the election, to say nothing of the stability of some of their governments, no other state chose to run against the Saudis, and on 17 October the General Assembly elected Saudi Arabia by overwhelming majority.

Twenty-four hours late, the present confusion started. In a press release on its website, the Saudi Foreign Ministry put out a statement stating that they would be declining their election the Security Council, citing “double standards” and the Council’s inability to meaningfully address the Syrian Civil War. Things got even more complicated at that day’s UN press briefing when UN spokesperson Martin Nesirky said that while he had seen the statement, the UN had received no official communication declining the election, meaning that as far as the Secretariat was concerned Saudi Arabia would be a member of the Security Council staring 1 January 2014.

While it took them about three weeks to get their act together, Saudi Arabia has since officially communicated its intention to decline its election to the UN, making way for new elections, but the underlying question remains: What the fuck? The question of why Saudis actually declined their election is far more perplexing than their past membership policy. The official reasons they cited simply don’t add up. Every independent analyst, from Louis Charbonneau, to Mark Leon Goldberg, to the Washington Post, to myself (though admittedly I’m nowhere near the level of expertise of the other three) agree that in taking a seat on the Council the Saudis are would have an excellent opportunity to address the very issues the cited as their reasons for refusing the seat.

It’s been my experience that no matter how different they are from myself, assuming that any actor in international relations is crazy is a fundamental mistake. This leads me conclude that there are other reasons. I just don’t know what they are.

Security Council Reform: The perspective not heard

It is a strange day indeed when I find myself agreeing with the Canadian government on a matter of foreign policy, yet that is exactly the case today. While I don’t particularly like his choice of words in his address to the General Assembly this morning, I appreciate the fact that John Baird spoke out against the obsession much of the rest of the world seems to have with reform of the United Nations and in particular of the Security Council. The system isn’t perfect. Some reforms are and always will be necessary. But how is it that whenever conversation turns to this organisation that does so much good work in this world and remains a pillar of the international community that the conversation invariably turns to reform?

The answer, at least as far as western world is concerned, is a simple one. There is a tendency to expect much more of the UN than of what is capable, and more than those things for which it was designed. It is because of this misunderstanding, that we all seem to agree, at least in principle, on Security Council reform for example. In seven years of studying the UN, I have never heard anyone make a compelling argument defending the status quo. Yet the arguments clearly exist, because, at least as far as membership goes, that’s precisely what I believe.

Let me say at the outset I think the working methods of the Council are flawed. What happens behind the scenes to negotiate the text of resolutions and presidential statements must be far more inclusive. Carne Ross, a former chief negotiator for the UK on the Security Council, once said that the people of Kosovo were never consulted on any of the resolutions the Council adopted concerning them, and that despite the fact that the UN ran the Kosovar government for nine years. The people effected by resolution should, whether through state or civil representation, be consulted in their drafting. That being said, changing the membership structure of the Council will not change that.

The point most often attacked, and understandably so, is the veto power, and choice of which states hold it. It is here that we come to our first instance of misunderstanding. In 1945, the founders of the United Nations were concerned about the possibility of a third world war. And who can blame them? There had been two in the past thirty years. In both cases, the spark that lead to war breaking out was a powerful country attacking a much weaker country, which in turn lead other powerful countries to take up arms against the former. In 1914, Austria’s invasion of Serbia provoked Russia into action. While in 1939, Germany’s invasion Poland provoked Britain and France. What was recognised then, and remains valid to this day, is that if there were to be a third world war, it would inevitably feature at least two of the P5 nations on opposing sides. So those states most likely to respond to overtly belligerent action were given the power to stop the UN from legitimising it.

In the same vein, the P5 nations remain the only ones capable of unilaterally undermining decisions of the Council. We saw this in 2003 with US invasion of Iraq, and in 2008 when Russia invaded Georgia. Granted, the UK and France have lost significant influence since 1945, but the EU of which they are a part is certainly more than capable of defying the Council should it so choose. On the other hand those states currently seeking permanent membership are not in that position. If India had objected to intervention in Mali, or Japan to sanctions against Guinea-Bissau, it would not have been a serious problem. These states contribute significantly to the United Nations and there support should sought whenever possible. Invariably, their approval of a particular Council action will be beneficial, but their objection is neither a threat to international peace and security, nor does it jeopardise the effectiveness of the action.

The second common criticism is that the Council is not representative, and I would agree with that. In terms of the number of member states, Asia is under represented among non-permanent seats, while Latin America is over represented among the rotating members. However, I reject the notion that this is a problem. The Council representativeness would be a virtue if the council were an activist body. It is not. As a rule, its inaction tends to be far more controversial that its action. There was significant pushback on the intervention in Libya, but that’s not surprising. A third of the Council did not support resolution 1973, and the intervening forces overstepped their mandate by quite a ways. That particular case notwithstanding, resolutions adopted by Council tend to reflect, at least in principle if not in the particulars, the consensus among international community.

Current composition of the Council is, in my opinion, a rather elegant balance of legitimacy, relevance, and effectiveness. The states that need to be there in order to give effect to the Council decisions are represented, there are enough other states, which are well distributed enough, to ensure that the rest of the world agrees with Council action, and the membership is small enough so that the Council can actually get things done. Council membership is not intuitive. The aesthetics of it often run contrary to our democratic sensibilities. That makes the Council an easy target for criticism. It does not, however, make it wrong.

The Mafia State of Azerbaijan: a Case Study of Maj. Ramil Safarov

            The case of Major Ramil Safarov has precious little to do with the UN, except that it is through the UN that I was made aware of it. It is one of the most disturbing stories to come out of the post-Soviet Caucasus recently. Not because of particular violence or brutality, thought it has plenty of that, but because of the utter contempt for the rule of law and of good faith negotiations that are essential for international relations demonstrated by the Azeri government.

            The Ramil Safarov case is just latest manifestation of tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia. As neighbouring peoples the Azeris and the Armenians have been in conflict for centuries. In its current form the conflict is about the Nagorno-Karabakh region, a de facto independent republic in western Azerbaijan with ethnic Armenians form a majority of the region’s population. Tension over control of the region built up in the late eighties, and escalated into all out war following the collapse of the Soviet Union. A Russian brokered ceasefire put an end to hostilities and remains in affect to this day, though both sides commit minor violations on an almost daily basis.

            It is only in this context that Maj. Safarov’s actions make any sense. In 2004, Safarov, then a lieutenant in the Azerbaijan Land Forces, participated in an English language course in Budapest with other officers from all over eastern Europe as part of NATO’s Partnership for Peace Initiative. On the night of 19 February, Lt. Safarov snuck into the dorm of Lt. Gurgen Margaryan, one of two Armenian officers on the course, and brutally murdered him with an axe. He also attempted to kill the other Armenian officer, but was arrested by Hungarian police before he was able to do so. After two years of trial, Hungarian courts sentenced him to life in prison with no possibility of parole for at least thirty years.

            The case took on a new dimension early this year when the Azeri government entered into the negotiations about the possibility of transferring Ramil Safarov to Azerbaijan to serve out the rest of his sentence there. After about six months of negotiation, the Hungarian government was satisfied that Azerbaijan had provided sufficient assurances under the European Convention on the Transfer of Convicted Persons, and Safarov was duly extradited. He was welcomed as a hero in Baku, was immediately granted a pardon by President Ilham Aliyev, promoted to Major, and awarded eight years back pay for the time he spent in prison.

            Appalling as all of this is, it’s not all that surprising when you take a closer look at the man behind the most recent developments. It’s not without reason that in the WikiLeaks cables, President Aliyev is likened to Michael Corleone. He is essentially a mafia boss. He has known ties to the Russian mob, and to criminal elements in the Azeri diaspora, and is a key figure in the Baku underworld. When construed as a mob kingpin rewarding one of his foot soldiers for killing a foot soldier of his most hated enemies, rather than as a head of state flouting international law, the whole affair seems disturbingly normal.

            What is far more concerning is that Azerbaijan currently holds a seat on the UN Security Council. There have been far more unsavoury governments represented on the council (Libya under Gadhafi, Argentina under Peron), this has usually due to functional necessity or lack of good alternatives, but this is not at all the case here. Both Hungary and Slovakia ran for the seat a little over a year ago, and it’s not like Azerbaijan’s is an essential voice for the maintenance of international peace and security. If anything, their actions in Nagorno-Karabakh actively threaten the stability of the region. The only reason I can see that they are on the council is that they ran a successful negative campaign, the first since 1980, against the other two candidates.

Negotiation is not sexy

As a Model UN delegate, an enthusiast for international relations, and, I would like to think, a somewhat accomplished negotiator, I am always a little miffed when, like last Monday, I am confronted with the extent to which negotiation is undervalued. It's considered worthwhile and necessary of course, butt simply put, in our society, negotiation is not sexy. Credit is rarely given where credit is due. For example, Al Gore is the only Kyoto delegate I can name. Of the people who negotiated the four plus two treaty that reunified Germany, only Eduard Shevarnadze, the Soviet delegate, is known to me, and only because he later served as president of Georgia. Without researching it, I could not name anyone present during the negotiations of the Oslo and Dayton Accords; just to name some of the most important negotiations of my lifetime. So naturally, when the Serbian and Kosovar Prime Ministers met for the first time on Monday, during a meeting of the UN Security Council, it took incredibly good luck for me to find out about it, by finding a copy of the Vienna Currier at the Niagara Falls bus terminal (I have no idea how it got there) and even then it was only two sentences at the bottom of page 10.

Reading the transcript of the meeting, in particular the social niceties spoken by the president at the very beginning, I can only imagine the amount of work that went into making the meeting happen. Since no one will, let me say the following: To the diplomats from New York City, to Pristina, to Belgrade and elsewhere, though nothing substantive was decided at the meeting, just getting these two men in the same room a huge step in the right direction, and I salute for it.

As for the meeting itself, it began with a statement by General Farid Zarif, head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), followed by statements by Ivica Dačić (Serbia), Hashim Thaçi (Kosovo), and all fifteen members of the Council. All of what was said was fairly routine. General Zarif described the situation in Kosovo, where the status quo has been more less maintain, precarious calm with continued instances of ethnically motivated violence, the Prime Ministers made statements of mutual non-recognition and politely accused each other of illegitimacy, the NAM and China pushed for further negotiations, Russia supported Serbia, and the US and the EU pushed for recognition of Kosovo's independence. 

What I find far more interesting is how these things were said. As I said earlier, the social niceties are particularly telling. The language use by Gérard Araud, the French representative, more less matched that of the Non-Aligned States while speaking as President of the Council, referring to Hashim Thaçi by his name only, but addressing him as His Excellency the Prime Minister of Kosovo while speaking for the French Republic. To me this suggests that the NAM, probably by simple strength in numbers, controls the UN's political position vis à vis Kosovo. 

Another interesting contrast in this respect, is that the NAM states all thanked Hashim Thaçi for his statement, while the Chinese representative, though making a similar statement on all other points, merely stated that he had merely “listened attentively to the statement made by Mr. Thaçi,” probably wanting to placate Russia who used the same sentence, word for word, at the beginning of their statement.

The final point that interests me, is that Ivica Dačić insinuated that certain countries, probably the EU and the US, have been playing political games with the UNMIK budget. According to Prime Minister Dačić, the General Assembly deliberately underfinanced the mission, making it necessary to rely more heavily on the, in his opinion illegitimate, Kosovar authorities in order to fulfil the mission's mandate.

A failure and a success - UNSMIS still in Syria without reason, Senegal to prosecute Hissène Habré

Friday saw two major developments at the UN. First, the Security Council adopted resolution S/RES/2059 (2012) that extends the mandate of the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) for thirty days without any other provisions. If you ask me, this is probably the worst possible decision. Even doing nothing would have been better in my opinion. The Syrian opposition has classified UNSMIS as ineffectual and useless, which is not surprising. Humanitarian law experts from the Red Cross, to the UN Human Rights Council, to Secretary-General have classified the situation in Syria as an internal armed conflict. Following the assassination of several ranking government officials, neither side seems willing to back down, or to be in a position where they could back down even if they wanted to do so. Wednesday's bombing in Damascus makes increasingly clear that Syria will almost certainly be in a state of all-out civil war for at least the next twelve months.

In that context, you have to ask yourself what good can three hundred unarmed observes do in a war zone covering almost a hundred and eighty thousand square kilometres. The mission's purpose was to supervise the implementation of Kofi Annan's peace plan, which Annan himself has declared a failure. It makes you wonder why all members of the Security Council (2059 was adopted unanimously) are so eager to renew this mission.

In terms of other military options, a Libyan style intervention is neither feasible politically nor advisable strategically. In the case of Libya, the government's trump card was the use its air force, an advantage easily negated by the imposition of a no-fly zone. In the case of Syria however, the problem is the government's use of tanks, artillery and other heavy weapons, which are not easily stopped from the air alone. The only strategically viable option I can think of is something resembling what UNPROFOR was supposed to do in Bosnia, and we all know what a disaster that was. 

On the non-military, economic sanction, in particular a rigorous arms embargo, on both sides, would hopefully take the edge of the conflict as the belligerents would begin to run out of ammunition. Of course this will never happen. The BRICS country's are to invested in their arms trade with the Syria government, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, backed by the US, being heavily involved in arming the opposition. Russia in particular has a vested interest in keeping Bashar al-Assad in power. With a NATO member, in the form Turkey, controlling the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, Russia's naval base in Syria is its only direct access to the Mediterranean Sea.

All that considered, my opinion is that the best of the few viable options for the UN is to do nothing, terrible as it may sound. Once a conflict has gotten this far, there is stopping, and with opposing interests at stake, accelerating its course to one outcome or another is not feasible. Meaning, any serious intervention on the part of the UN would only unnecessarily jeopardise lives, without any significant impact.

The other major development on Friday was the final judgement ICJ in Question Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal). In stark contrast to the negative decisions of the Security Council on Syria, I can only describe the judgement as a positive outcome. The concerns former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré, who is currently residing in Senegal. 

 

I'll begin with a bit of background information. Habré came to power in Chad in 1982 as the head of a coup d'état, only to be ousted by a coup himself in 1990. He is accused of political repression, using torture and forced disappearances during his time in office. It's not without reason he has been nicknamed the African Pinochet. Following his fall from power, Habré fled to Senegal, where he has been living ever since. 

After a failed attempt to bring him to trial in Senegal in 2000, several Chadian exiles instituted criminal proceedings against him Belgium under the passive personality laws. These laws say for the most serious crimes under international, namely genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, Belgian courts have jurisdiction if the alleged perpetrator or victim is a citizen or a resident of Belgium. In the case of Hissène Habré, this law is further internationally by the UN Convention against Torture (CAT).

The courts judgement begins with a number of procedural questions. First it evaluates Senegal's claim that there is no dispute between Belgium and Senegal on this question. Given that several Belgian extradition requests, backed by an INTERPOL red-notice, have been declined, and that since 2000 no Senegalese court has dealt with the matter internally, the Court comes to the obvious conclusion that this claim is patently absurd. Next it considers other question surrounding the Court's jurisdiction in this case. It finds that it doesn't have jurisdiction to consider Belgium's claims under customary international law, but does have jurisdiction to evaluate question relating to the CAT. 

 

The final procedural question considered by the court is the admissibility of Belgium's claim, and this is where it gets gets particularly interesting. The court finds that Belgium's claim is admissible simply because it is party to the Convention against Torture: “[T]he Court concludes that Belgium, as a state party to the Convention against Torture, has standing to invoke the responsibility of Senegal for the alleged breaches of its obligations under...the Convention in present proceedings.” It goes on to state that whatever particular right Belgium may in the proceedings is therefore not relevant.

 This is particularly powerful, because it means that Senegal has breached its international obligations, not only towards Belgium, but towards every other State party to CAT. This means that there are now some 145 countries with a right, maybe even an obligation, to demand that Senegal bring Hissène Habré to trial, or extradite him to another country for that purpose.

Finally, the court evaluates the substantive merits of the case, and comes to the natural conclusion that Senegal has an obligation to prosecute or extradite Hissène Habré and that its reason for not doing so are insufficient under international law:

“The Court...unanimously finds that the Republic of Senegal must, without further delay, submit the case of Mr. Hissène Habré to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, if it does not extradite him.”

Bill 78 as bad as Syria? The power of press distortion

After a six week absence, I find I once again have the necessary time and energy to research and write my opinions again properly. I will most likely not be continuing this blog as a weekly feature, but I will post my thoughts on the UN from time to time.

Today I will focus, by means of an example, on an issue that has bothered almost since I first started studying the United Nations. To most who have not studied it, the function and politics of the UN are deeply misunderstood. I will focus on a recent example of this and attempt to rectify this problem at least among the few who will read this.

My example is from a few weeks ago when Navi Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights delivered her annual address to the Human Rights Council. For this speech she was heavily criticised in the press, in particular in Quebec, for addressing the on going student protests there and human rights implications of bill 78, while neglecting to even mention human rights situation in Syria. To the uniformed observer, this will undoubtedly seem strange, even outrageous, but the inclusion and exclusion criteria for the speech are simply not understood, or even considered in the press.

First one must consider Madam Pillay's audience. These people are Permanent- and Deputy Permanent Representatives the UN Offices in Geneva. Not only did all of them know in advance what Madam Pillay would say, but are sufficiently well informed to be aware of almost any fact she could included in her address. As such, one must conclude that purpose of this speech was not informative, making the gravity of a situation not the only, and certainly not the foremost inclusion criteria. 

What has to be understood, is that the High Commissioner is essentially a lobbyist. She has little to no executive authority, and has an incredibly limited means with which to implement an agenda of improving human rights. What influence she has, she draws from using her credentials as a human rights expert and the legitimacy given to her through her appointment by the Secretary-General and confirmation by the General Assembly, to convince those with actual power to make decisions in line with goals of her office. One can therefore conclude that purpose of her speech was persuasive, her choice of words weighed against the substantive affect of saying or not saying them.

In the case of Syria, one must also consider, in addition the High Commissioner's work, the other UN initiatives in that country, the so-called Stabilisation Mission, Kofi Anan's work as Joint Special Envoy, and to a lesser extent the mediation process regarding the Golan Heights. The Syrian government has on numerous occasions, quite vocally expressed its displeasure at Madam Pillay's work. Just shortly before this speech, the General Assembly voted to extend her mandate, which was set to expire at the end of August, by a count of 192 in favour to 1 against, Syria's being the only voice of dissent. Considering these circumstances, an inflammatory speech condemning Syria's actions, while undoubtedly warranted, would have provoked a strong negative response, and would have done more to undermine than to advance the UN's interests in Syria, and would have done more harm than good to the human rights situation on the ground.

In stark contrast to Syria, Canada is a democracy where public perception of leaders is vital to their ability to function, a country in which “name and shame” is a viable lobbying strategy. Obviously, Navi Pillay is not well known in Canada and her addressing the current situation in Quebec will have little affect, but it will the overall affect will be positive. Given the of the Canadian federation, the High Commissioner's contact with the Quebec government is fairly limited, and as hostile as the current government is to the United Nations, I have to think that the federal government is to invested in the aims Madam Pillay's office to care if she criticises a Canadian province, especially when some of criticism is due. 

The second advantage of addressing bill 78 is that in criticising a western country, the High Commissioner demonstrates, in particular to the developing world, that she is not subordinate the interests of rich, and will gain some small amount of political capital to expend where her work is more urgently needed.

In conclusion, I have to say that I deeply concerned by the willingness in the press to take the words of one of the most competent human rights experts on the planet and misconstrue them, without any regard for how they were chosen, to form a statement that is patently ridiculous, that the violence in Syria and the student protests in Quebec are of comparable gravity. Though I have to admit I can understand why. Outrage sells.