Sunday, May 6, 2012

6 May 2012


This was a fairly slow week at the UN. The General Assembly is completely out of session, having held no official meetings this week. The high profile issues like the deployment of UNSMIS are largely in the procedural stage. There are still a number of issues I'd like to discuss.


Three weeks after expressing its intention to toughen sanction on North Korea, the Security Council finalized the updates to the sanctions regime last Wednesday. In addition to prohibiting the import and export of the latest nuclear and ballistic missile technologies, the Council decided to subject three new North Korean firms to an asset freeze, a state-owned bank and two state-owned export companies. All three are suspected of trying to sell North Korean missile technology to Iran. 

Despite all the tough talk surrounding the adoption of the new sanctions, best I can tell, this is simply an attempt to close loop-holes that have developed in the sanctions over the passed few years. In 2009, the Council identified Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) as North Korea's primary arms dealer. In it's the description of Green Pine Corporation, one of the three companies put under sanction week, the UN stated that “Green Pine [had] taken over many of the activities of KOMID.” Given the highly provocative nature of last month's missile launch, I'd be shocked if the North Korean leadership didn't see this coming and pulled essential assets out of Green Pine, and the other two companies, before they were subjected to the freeze, only to restart the companies under different names, as they did with KOMID three years ago. So long as the Council continues to impose sanctions in a reactionary manner North Korea will be able to side step key elements of the sanctions against them.


On the same day, the Council also adopted a resolution on the inter-Sudanese conflict. The resolution imposed a seven-point cease-fire plan, and requires both Sudanese states to unconditionally return to the negotiating table about finalising the border, and agreements on oil and gas revenue. What surprised me about this resolution was not so much the content, but the time it took to get it adopted. On 26 April, the US distributed an extremely draft resolution. The only difference is that the American draft decided that Sudan would accept the tripartite proposal by the AU, the UN, and the Arab League, whereas the adopted resolution strongly urges them to accept, and the American draft threatened sanctions if both states did not comply, the resolution does not. I find it hard to believe that it took almost a week to adopt such minor changes. The only thing I can imagine is that the US and the European members of the Council were insisting on the provision about sanctions, while Russia, China, and the Presidency, currently held by Azerbaijan, strongly objected. 


The other two points of interest for me this week were a pair of reports released by the Secretary-General. The first is on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). Kosovo represents somewhat of an anomaly in the UN system. After Palau was accepted as a UN member in 1994, the Trusteeship Council concluded its mandate and there were no more territories under direct UN administration. Yet in 1999, following the end of the Yugoslav Wars, the Security Council established UNMIK to essentially serve as the Kosovar government. At present however, UNMIK's role is minimal. Most of the day to day administrative activities are handled by the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo with support from the EU mission EULEX and KFOR. The key political problems addressed in the report are largely due to today's parliamentary and presidential elections in Serbia. Regions of northern Kosovo, where Serbs form the majority, had wanted to hold local elections under the same time table and in accordance with Serbian law. Perhaps more detrimental, these same communities, with backing from Belgrade, held a referendum last February asking voters whether they accepted the Kosovo's self-proclaimed government. The governments authority was overwhelmingly rejected, but given the way it was conducted, the referendum has little legitimacy, and according to UNMIK, no legal consequences.

In the long term, I think universal recognition of Kosovo's independence is inevitable. Last March, the EU agreed to accept Serbia as a candidate-country after three years consideration. It will probably be in Serbia's best interest to accede to the EU. Something which will remain impossible until the Kosovo question is resolved. All EU members, except Greece, Roumania, and Spain, have recognised Kosovo's independence. In 2008, the ICJ ruled that the Kosovo's declaration of independence was done in conformity with international law. Given these circumstances, recognition by Serbia is the most likely resolution.


The other report is on an issue that has received almost no attention in the West, namely the political situation in Guinea-Bissau. If nothing else, this report serves to highlight the severe apathy in the West for issues in Sub-Saharan Africa. Almost a month ago, element in the armed forces of Guinea-Bissau carried out a coup-d'état, arresting the President, the Prime Minister, and the Chief of Defence Staff. Other key government officials, including the President of the Supreme Court and at least three cabinet ministers have been forced into hiding. 

As was the case with coup in Mali several weeks ago, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) immediately began mediation for a return to constitutional order. The AU and the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) both suspended Guinea-Bissau's membership. ECOWAS, the AU, and the CPLP have all declared their intention to impose sanction against coup leaders. The EU and the UN are considering doing the same. 

The Secretary-General suggested four possible option to the Security Council in his report: Mediation, targeted sanctions, the deployment of training and protection units, and the deployment of a peacekeeping force. Even though it was requested by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the deployment of a peacekeeping force seems unlikely in my opinion. The Security situation in Guinea-Bissau is calm, meaning such a deployment would only heighten tensions. That the UN will lend its support to mediation, almost goes without saying. It's the other to proposals that are less clear cut to me. In a presidential statement two weeks ago, the Council said it would consider targeted sanctions. Whether or not it will follow through remains to be seen. As for the training and protection units, I'm not entirely sure what that would look like, but given that the Peacebuiling Commission already has troops on the ground, it seems like a feasible option.

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