This was a fairly slow
week at the UN. The General Assembly is completely out of session,
having held no official meetings this week. The high profile issues
like the deployment of UNSMIS are largely in the procedural stage.
There are still a number of issues I'd like to discuss.
Three weeks after
expressing its intention to toughen sanction on North Korea, the
Security Council finalized the updates to the sanctions regime last
Wednesday. In addition to prohibiting the import and export of the
latest nuclear and ballistic missile technologies, the Council
decided to subject three new North Korean firms to an asset freeze, a
state-owned bank and two state-owned export companies. All three are
suspected of trying to sell North Korean missile technology to Iran.
Despite all the tough
talk surrounding the adoption of the new sanctions, best I can tell,
this is simply an attempt to close loop-holes that have developed in
the sanctions over the passed few years. In 2009, the Council
identified Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) as
North Korea's primary arms dealer. In it's the description of Green
Pine Corporation, one of the three companies put under sanction week,
the UN stated that “Green Pine [had] taken over many of the
activities of KOMID.” Given the highly provocative nature of last
month's missile launch, I'd be shocked if the North Korean leadership
didn't see this coming and pulled essential assets out of Green Pine,
and the other two companies, before they were subjected to the
freeze, only to restart the companies under different names, as they
did with KOMID three years ago. So long as the Council continues to
impose sanctions in a reactionary manner North Korea will be able to
side step key elements of the sanctions against them.
On the same day, the
Council also adopted a resolution on the inter-Sudanese conflict. The
resolution imposed a seven-point cease-fire plan, and requires both
Sudanese states to unconditionally return to the negotiating table
about finalising the border, and agreements on oil and gas revenue.
What surprised me about this resolution was not so much the content,
but the time it took to get it adopted. On 26 April, the US
distributed an extremely draft resolution. The only difference is
that the American draft decided that Sudan would accept the
tripartite proposal by the AU, the UN, and the Arab League, whereas
the adopted resolution strongly urges them to accept, and the
American draft threatened sanctions if both states did not comply,
the resolution does not. I find it hard to believe that it took
almost a week to adopt such minor changes. The only thing I can
imagine is that the US and the European members of the Council were
insisting on the provision about sanctions, while Russia, China, and
the Presidency, currently held by Azerbaijan, strongly objected.
The other two points
of interest for me this week were a pair of reports released by the
Secretary-General. The first is on the United Nations Interim
Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). Kosovo represents somewhat of an
anomaly in the UN system. After Palau was accepted as a UN member in
1994, the Trusteeship Council concluded its mandate and there were no
more territories under direct UN administration. Yet in 1999,
following the end of the Yugoslav Wars, the Security Council
established UNMIK to essentially serve as the Kosovar government. At
present however, UNMIK's role is minimal. Most of the day to day
administrative activities are handled by the self-proclaimed Republic
of Kosovo with support from the EU mission EULEX and KFOR. The key
political problems addressed in the report are largely due to today's
parliamentary and presidential elections in Serbia. Regions of
northern Kosovo, where Serbs form the majority, had wanted to hold
local elections under the same time table and in accordance with
Serbian law. Perhaps more detrimental, these same communities, with
backing from Belgrade, held a referendum last February asking voters
whether they accepted the Kosovo's self-proclaimed government. The
governments authority was overwhelmingly rejected, but given the way
it was conducted, the referendum has little legitimacy, and according
to UNMIK, no legal consequences.
In the long term, I
think universal recognition of Kosovo's independence is inevitable.
Last March, the EU agreed to accept Serbia as a candidate-country
after three years consideration. It will probably be in Serbia's best
interest to accede to the EU. Something which will remain impossible
until the Kosovo question is resolved. All EU members, except Greece,
Roumania, and Spain, have recognised Kosovo's independence. In 2008,
the ICJ ruled that the Kosovo's declaration of independence was done
in conformity with international law. Given these circumstances,
recognition by Serbia is the most likely resolution.
The other report is on
an issue that has received almost no attention in the West, namely
the political situation in Guinea-Bissau. If nothing else, this
report serves to highlight the severe apathy in the West for issues
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Almost a month ago, element in the armed
forces of Guinea-Bissau carried out a coup-d'état, arresting the
President, the Prime Minister, and the Chief of Defence Staff. Other
key government officials, including the President of the Supreme
Court and at least three cabinet ministers have been forced into
hiding.
As was the case with
coup in Mali several weeks ago, the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) immediately began mediation for a return to
constitutional order. The AU and the Community of Portuguese Speaking
Countries (CPLP) both suspended Guinea-Bissau's membership. ECOWAS,
the AU, and the CPLP have all declared their intention to impose
sanction against coup leaders. The EU and the UN are considering
doing the same.
The Secretary-General
suggested four possible option to the Security Council in his report:
Mediation, targeted sanctions, the deployment of training and
protection units, and the deployment of a peacekeeping force. Even
though it was requested by the Prime Minister and the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, the deployment of a peacekeeping force seems
unlikely in my opinion. The Security situation in Guinea-Bissau is
calm, meaning such a deployment would only heighten tensions. That
the UN will lend its support to mediation, almost goes without
saying. It's the other to proposals that are less clear cut to me. In
a presidential statement two weeks ago, the Council said it would
consider targeted sanctions. Whether or not it will follow through
remains to be seen. As for the training and protection units, I'm not
entirely sure what that would look like, but given that the
Peacebuiling Commission already has troops on the ground, it seems
like a feasible option.
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